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STATKMENT OF THE CASE

I. Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal of an Industrial Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration. The
Claimant contends that she is entitled to ongoing medical care, temporary partial/and or
temporary total disability (TPD/TTD) benefits, and total permanent disability (PPD) benefits.
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition:
The Claimant (Ms. Shubert) was employee at Macy's department store at the Boise Town
Square Mall location. She had worked there since 2002. On May 1, 2006 the Claimant was
injured in a work-related fall. (Tr., p.27, L. 11-25; p.28, L.1-25).The Claimant received medical
treatment thru workman's compensation from August 31, 2006 thru November 21, 2007.
On November 21, 2007, workman's compensation's physician Dr. Nancy Greenwald
M.D. told the Claimant when she came in for her scheduled appointment that she had reached
her maximum medical improvement (MMI) even though the Claimant discussed and filled out a
report for Dr. Greenwald of the serious ongoing medical issues she was still having as a result of
the work-related injury. (Def. Ex. G, p.86)(a). Dr. Greenwald assessed a PPI of 5% of the whole
person and released the Claimant from her care.
The Claimant called Dr. Greenwald' s office to ask if she could get additional medical
help. Dr. Greenwald's assistant Valerie told the Claimant, "No, you cannot come back." ( Tr., p.
41, L. 21-25 ).
On June 22, 2009, the Claimant filed a workman's compensation complaint ( R., p.1-2 ).
On November 13, 2012 there was a hearing with the Industrial Commission's Referee Michael
E. Powers and the Defendant's attorney Mr. Kent W. Day. (Tr., Vol. I). An Order was issued
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from the Industrial Commission on June 19, 2013 with their recommendations and approval of
Referee Power's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. ( R., p. 6 ).
The Claimant filed a motion for reconsideration of the Commission's Order on July 9,
2013. ( R., p. 27-28 ). The Claimant contended that she was entitled to a permanent partial
disability rating exceeding 10%; reimbursement of prior out-of pocket personal paid medical
expenses related to her work-related injury; that she was entitled to a permanent on-going
monthly income because of her chronic pain since her work related injury; that she was not MMI
on or after November 21, 2007; that she was entitled to additional medical benefits beyond the
MMI date; and that she was entitled to ongoing disability benefits. ( R., p. 31-32 ).
The Commission denied the request in an Order Denying Reconsideration on August 16,
2013. ( R., p. 38 ). The Claimant then respectfully exercised her right to make an appeal of the
Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration to the Idaho Supreme Court on September 26,
2013. ( R., p.43 ). The Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was dated on October 18,
2013.

III. Concise Statement of Facts:
The Claimant was 57 years old at the time of hearing before Referee Powers of the
Industrial Commission. She began working for Macy's department store at the Boise Town
Square Mall in 2002. She was a sales associate in the women's department and her duties
included filling in at various department locations as needed.
On May 1, 2006, the Claimant was assigned to work in the Woman's World department.
When she went up there they (other work associates) were telling her "Watch out for the mat, it's
got holes in it, everybody is tripping on it and so all day, and then I close by myself, you know, I
tripped a few times." ( Tr., p.27, L.16-23)
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After the store closes at 9:00 pm, the lights begin to automatically shut down. The
Claimant was wrapping up her duties and it was getting dark back in there when she came back
to get her purse and came around the comer and tipped on the mat with the holes and fell with
her leg bent. ( Tr., p.28, L. 1-25 ). She felt pain immediately and finally was able to get up and
clocked out and went home. The work-related injury was reported the next day to a supervisor,
but nobody followed up with her so on May 16, 2006, the Claimant asked a manager if the
accident had been reported. The Claimant was told to fill out an incident report, and she did so.
The Claimant did not immediately seek treatment for her work-related injury because a
manager told her that such treatment probably would not be covered. ( Tr., p. 30 L. 1-25 ). After
about three months the Claimant was not getting any better and she was told to go to Primary
Health where she saw Cory Huffine, N.P. and was diagnosed with a low back strain and left hip
pain. Mr. Hufffine prescribed anti-inflammatory medication, but the Claimant told Mr. Huffine
she could not take that medication because it would cause her urinary tract infection. ( R., p. 910 ). The Claimant was referred to the occupational medicine department. ( R., p. 10, par. 9, L. 12 ).

On September 6, 2006, the Claimant was examined by Dr. Scott Lossman, M.D. at
Primary Health's occupation medicine department. His report stated the Claimant's chief
complaint was left side pain. Dr. Lossman opined that she had low back strain with sacroiliitis on
the left and left leg sciatic. He further stated, "Of note #1 and #2 are reasonably medically workrelated." (Cl.Ex. F /Dr.Lossman/ 09/06/2006, p. 2 ). The Claimant had appointments with Dr.
Lossman on October 11, 2006 and October 19, 2006 where he again noted the Claimants ongoing left hip and low back pain as high as 10/10. Dr. Lossman also noted that the Claimant
thinks physical therapy is actually making it worse-not better. Dr. Lossman noted that she is
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still working ... she says her work wants her to work more hours, but she does not want to, does
not feel that she can." He opined on both examinations dates that "this injury is reasonably and
medically work related." ( Cl. Ex. FI Dr. Lossman / 10/11/2006, p.1/; 10/19/2006 p. l ).
The Claimant was referred to physical therapy by Dr. Lossman. The Claimant's
evaluation by Raj Issure of The Athletic Training Center stated that the patient reported that
bending and sitting for prolonged periods of time increased her pain in the left hip and sacroiliac
joint areas ... that the patient was guarded in the low back and moved slowly during transfer
from sitting to standing ... ( Def. Ex. H, p.87 ). The Claimant went four times to physical therapy
from September 22, 2006 thru October 3, 2006. (Def.Ex. H, p. 88-91 ). Dr. Lossman stopped
physical therapy because of the Claimant's pain and ordered an MRI appointment for the
Claimant.
The Claimant on October 25, 2006 met with Dr. Diane Newton, M.D. /Advanced Open
Imaging. Dr. Newton's MRI findings noted an L4-5 minimal annulus bulge ... with an annular
tear. ( Cl. Ex. F I Advanced Open Imagining/ 10/25/06, p.1-2 ).
On November 02, 2006 the Claimant was examined again by Dr. Lossman where he
again noted the Claimant's chief complaint as low back strain and sacroiliitis. He further noted
that she says she feels worse some days and certainly does not feel better and that she has
burning pain, feeling like a hot poker on the left lateral. ..The MRI showed an L4-L5 annular
disk tear. Pain 8/10. Again Dr. Lossman stated "this injury is reasonably medically workrelated." ( CL Ex.FI Dr. Lossman / 11/02/2006. p.1 ).
Upon a referral from Dr. Lossman, the Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Greenwald
M.D. on December 11, 2006. Dr. Greenwald refused to provide her with a permission slip to
miss work despite the Claimant's severe pain. Dr. Greenwald did give the Claimant lifting
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restrictions. Dr. Greenwald ordered an EMG and suggested epidural injections into the SI joint.
The Claimant didn't want to do the injections because her sister and mother had experienced bad
side effects from receiving such injections. ( R., p. 11 12 ).
The Claimant continued to meet with Dr. Greenwald. The Claimant had been going to
physical therapy and was using Lidoderm patches. The Claimant was still working at Macy's
despite the serious pain because Dr. Greenwald would not give her time off work. On April 11,
2007 (almost a year after the injury), the Claimant continued to express her severe pain issues
related to her work-related injury to Dr. Greenwald--seeing no improvement she ordered another

MRI.
The Claimant met with Dr. Anthony Giaupue, M.D./Intermountain Medical Imaging.
Another MRI confirmed at the L4-5 there is a broad based disk bulging fissuring and tearing of
the left foraminal/far lateral annual fibers. (Cl. Ex. F / Imtermountain Medical Imaging/
05/24/2007 p.1 )
Dr. Greenwald requested an IME. The Claimant on August 9, 2007 met with Dr. Kevin
Krafft, M.D. Dr. Kraft stated in his independent medical examination report that the Claimant
denies having any prior difficulties similar to those she is now experiencing since the workrelated injury. The MRI shows an L4-5 annular disc tear and a broad based disc bulge at L4-5
with fissuring and tearing of the far left annular fibers. The Claimant's chief complaint is pain in
left leg with burning, cramping, stabbing, pain is reported as constant. Dr. Kraft also stated that
to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there is a causal relationship between examinee's
current complaints and the reported injury." Dr. Krafft also stated "the examinee (Ms. Shubert)
has not achieved maximum medical improvement." (Cl.Ex.FI Boise Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation / 08-09-2007/ p.1,4,5,6, 10,11,12 ).
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Dr. Kraft, in a letter to Marsha Gregory/Liberty Northwest dated August 13, 2007, stated,
"On a more probable than not basis her (Claimants) current symptoms are likely the result of her
accident." As to the question "Is the patient's condition fixed and stable?"-Dr. Kraft states,
"Not as yet." (Cl.Ex.FI Boise Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. /08/13/2007/ p.l).
In October 2007, the Claimant again met with Dr. Greenwald to discuss Dr. Kraft's
medical opinions and the Claimant's ongoing medical symptoms in her groin and pain down her
left leg. Per Dr. Greenwald' s recommendation the Claimant agreed to another round of physical
therapy with Breda Chow of Hands on Therapy. Dr. Greenwald suggested a trial of Neurontin
and Claimant agreed to try the prescription. ( R., p. 14 ).
On November 1, 2007 the Claimant had another appointment with Dr. Greenwald in
which she complained of her new pain in her buttocks and the continuing pain in her left leg. The
Claimant had attended physical therapy eight times and Dr. Greenwald agreed to stop physical
therapy because it was not helping. The Claimant also informed Dr. Greenwald that she had to
stop taking the Neurontin after about 10 days because it was burning her bladder. Dr. Greenwald
stopped that prescription and gave the Claimant a prescription for Lyrica. ( R., p. ).
On November 21, 2007 the Claimant met with Dr. Greenwald for the last time. The
Claimant in the office report to Dr. Greenwald stated her concern over the ongoing constant pain.
Dr. Greenwald suggested a diagnostic epidural injection again, but the Claimant declined
because as stated before her sister and mother had bad experiences and serious side effects with
that procedure. Dr. Greenwald in this same meeting told the Claimant she had reached her MMI
and that there was nothing further she could offer in terms of pain relief and released her from
her care. Dr. Greenwald assessed her a PPI of 5% of the whole person due to the Claimant's
difficulty with daily activities and work. ( R., p.15 ).
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The Claimant after being released from workman's comp medical care called Dr.
Greenwald' s office and asked for additional help. Dr. Greenwald' s assistant, Valerie, said, "No
you cannot come back." ( Tr., p. 41, L.27-25/ p.42, L.1-3 ).
The Claimant sought other medical help for her ongoing pain and medical issues
resulting from her work-related injury. She met with Dr. Roman Schwartsman, M.D. on June 26,
2008. He noted she has radiating pain down the back of the leg and into the lateral calf and into
the foot. An MRI shows a broad based disc bulge and fissuring of the lateral annular fibers. The
pathology is on the left side at L4-5, which correlates with the location of the patient's symptoms
specifically the weakness and radiation of her pain. Dr. Schwartsman opined that "I do however
feel that the majority of her symptoms are coming from her lumbar spine specifically the annular
tear." ( Cl. Ex. F / Dr. Roman Schwartsman /06/26/2008. p.1-2). Dr. Schwartsman
recommended she see a spine surgeon.
The Claimant was examined by Dr. Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. a neurosurgeon on July 31,
2008. Dr. Frizzell noted that she has had MRI imaging ... she has seen psychiatry and has gone
thru extensive physical therapy. She has been through several medications as well. She has had
follow-up imaging studies. She has seen specialist, and an orthopedist as well. Dr. Frizzell
reported that "It is my medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, that Ms. Shubert's
ongoing left-sided low back, left hip and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1,
2006. I do not believe that Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." ( Cl.
Ex. F /Dr.Frizzell/ 07/31/2008 p. 1-.4).
Dr. Frizzell felt that the Claimant might benefit from a spinal cord stimulator and referred
her to Dr. Sandra Thompson, M.D. The Claimant did have this surgery where they inserted a
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metal rod in her back. This surgery did not help with the ongoing pain from her work-related
injury, but actually "made it worse." ( Tr., p. 47, L. 1-25 ).
The Claimant because of her ongoing medical issues from her work-related injury filed a
workman's compensation complaint on June 22, 2009. The Claimant had a hearing before
Referee Michael E. Powers of the Industrial Commission on November 13, 2012.
On June 19, 2013, Referee Powers filed his proposed Finding of Fact, Conclusion of
Law, and Recommendation. Referee Powers stated the Conclusions of Law: 1) Claimant was
medically stable on and after November 21, 2007 (MMI date); 2) Claimant is not entitled to
additional medical benefits beyond the MMI date; 3) Claimant is not entitled to temporary
disability benefits (TTD) or (TPD); 4) Claimant is entitled to a permanent partial impairment
(PPI) of 5% of whole person; and 5) Claimant is entitled to a permanent disability rating of 10%
inclusive of her permanent impairment. ( R., p. 23 ).
The Claimant filed a request for the Commission to reconsider the decision order by
Referee Powers. On July 9, 2013 this request was submitted to the Commission. She contended
that because of the seriousness of her ongoing pain and medical problems that she was entitled to
over and above the permanent partial disability rating of 10%.
On August 16, 2013, the Commission filed an Order Denying Reconsideration stating
that the Claimant's request for additional medical care is not supported by the record and that the
Claimant did not present any evidence from an expert regarding disability in excess of
impairment.
The Claimant felt her only legal recourse was to exercise her legal right to appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court. The Claimant filed a notice of appeal to the Commission on September
26, 2013 and a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on October 18, 2013.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted
when they concluded that the Claimant was medically stable on and after November
21, 2007 (lVIMI date)
II. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted
when they denied the Claimant ongoing medical benefits that are causally related to
her work-related injury
III. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused of their discretion when they
did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted
when they denied the Claimant total and partial temporary disability benefits
IV. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted
when they failed to conclude that the Claimant should be entitled to total permanent
disability benefits
V. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they did
not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence submitted
when they concluded that the Claimant was able to enter the labor market at the
time of her hearing

Standard of Appellate Review

The Claimant is aware of the legal privilege and importance regarding her right to make
an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The Claimant is aware that this Court exercises free review over legal conclusions, but
will not set aside any finding of fact which are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Excell Constrnction, Inc., v State Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688, 116 P 3d 18, (Idaho App,
2005). This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Commission's Order pursuant to
Article V, Section 9 of the Idaho Constitution; LC. 72-724 and 72-1368(9), and Idaho Appellate
Rules 4 and 14(b). The Claimant respectfully contents that she does have substantial and
competent evidence to support her lawful appeal to this Court.
9

ARGUMENT
I. That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when they

did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence
submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was medically stable on and
after November 21, 2007 (MMI date)
If the Commission does not make a correct and proper application of the law in regards to
the evidence on record, the Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion. Blayney v. City of
Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P2d 972 ( 1986).
The Claimant is aware that this Court will not set aside any finding of fact that are
supported by substantial and competent evidence, but that this Court does review questions of
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's
findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). The Court's
definition of substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128
Idaho 161, 164, 911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996).
The Claimant contends that the Commission did not make a correct and proper
application of the law in regards to the evidence submitted at her hearing. The lawful role of the
Commission is "finder of fact." Idaho Const. Art V section 9. This Courts review is generally
limited to questions of law. Id. However, if the findings of the Commission are not "supported
by substantial competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive" and should be appealed
for review. Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975). In such
instances, the findings of fact will be set aside on appeal. Id.
The Claimant asserts that the Commission's findings have not met the evidence standard
legally required by this Court. The Commission in their Order Denying Reconsideration stated
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that the Claimant did not supply ''any evidence from any expert regarding disability in excess of
impairment." ( R., p. 40, bottom paragraph). Respectfully this is an erroneous statement by the
Commission because the Claimant did submit at her hearing Ex. D her Social Security
Administration claim stating that she is disabled. (Tr., p.14, L.9-14).The Claimant's Exhibit D
did provide evidence from a medical expert regarding the Claimant's disability in excess of
impairment.
It should be noted that Referee Powers excluded this exhibit because "their system in
determining disability is much different than ours." ( Tr., p. 14, L .9 -12 ). The United States
Supreme Court has held that an agency "may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for
evidence presented at a hearing." Kyu Son Yi v. State Bd. Of Veterinary Med., 960 A.2d 864,
870 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (citing 42 Am. Jur. Publ. Admin. Law 130.) The Claimant's Exhibit
D was readmitted back into the Agency Records per the Claimant's Objection to Records. ( R., p.
54 ).
The Claimant's issue is not whether their system in determining disability is different that
the Commissions-it is asserted by the Claimant that the lawful issue is that the Commission
abused their role as "finder of facts" when they failed to consider the competent and substantial
evidence that she submitted from an medical expert regarding the her disability in excess of
impairment. The Claimant submitted this compelling evidence in support of her claim that she
was not MMI as concluded by the Commission on November 21, 2007.
It is also contended the Commission failed in their lawful role as "finder of fact" because
they did not give credibility to expert medical opinion from an "expert who had reviewed all the
relevant medical records." The standard set by the Court is that the Commission could decide
'not' to give credibility to an expert where the expert had "failed to review all the relevant
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medical records." Mazzone v Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302, p .3d 718 (2013).
The Court ruling is that the Referee and Commission "must accept as true the positive,
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable, or
rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's
Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447, 72 P 2d 171,175 (1937).
When reviewed in light of this Court's evidence credibility standard the Claimant's Ex. D
fulfills this legal standard because Administrative Law Judge Molleur asserted that he had
"carefully reviewed the entire record." (Cl. Ex. D, p.1). This is substantial and competent
credible evidence from an expert who states that the Claimant is disabled and that onset of her
disability was preceded by a work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006. (Cl.
Ex. D, p.4).
The Court has again affirmed that the role of the Commission referee is that of a "finder
of fact" and "not a medical expert and that permitting a referee to exceed his or her role as finder
of fact underlies the legal purpose of the Industrial Commissions proceedings to accommodate
Claimants and promote justice in simple proceedings." Hagler, 118 Idaho 599, 798 P.2d 58
( 1990). The Commission has a lawful responsibility as finder of fact to accommodate claimants
and promote justice-the Claimant contends that the Commission legally failed in both of these
roles regarding her appeal.
Judge John T. Molleur /Administrative Law Judge for the Social Security
Administration/Office of Disability Adjudication and Review in his decision date March 29,
2011 stated regarding the Claimant's disability-"fully favorable." Per his statement, "After
careful review of the 'entire record', the undersigned (Judge Molleur) finds the claimant has
been disabled from November 25, 2008." (Cl.Ex. D, p. l). Again the concern is not "how" did
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they determine the Claimant was disabled, but rather that this expert opinion was submitted as
evidence to support the Claimant's appeal that she was not MMI on or after November 21, 2007.
Per the Court this evidence has met the requirement in Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154
Idaho 750, 302, p .3d 718 (2013).
Judge Molleur states in regards to the Claimant's medical condition:
" ... that the medical records further support the Claimant's allegations of disabling
impairments. The Claimants onset of disability was preceded by a work-related injury when
she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006 ... since that time she has complained of radiating pain
down the back of her leg. Dr. Schwartsman noted that she has annual tears L4-5, which
correlated with the location of the Claimant's symptoms, specifically the weakness and
radiation." ( CL Ex. D, p.4 ). He further stated that the Claimant testified that "she worked at
Macys for seven years and stopped when her pain became too great." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 ).
Judge Molleur further states that:
"After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the Claimant's
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged
symptoms, and that the Claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are generally credible. At the hearing, the Claimant
testified extensively regarding her impairments and limitations. Overall, she described a
lifestyle significantly limited by pain. She can no longer perform many household chores.
Those that she can perform, such as laundry, must be done piecemeal." (Cl.Ex. D, p.4 ).
"She has undergone numerous conservative and invasive treatment modalities.
Unfortunately, these treatments have not provided relief. Further, in March 2009, she sought
a consultation with Dr. Frizzell who opined that she was 'not a surgical candidate.' Most
recently, the Claimant participated in another course of physical therapy, which increased her
symptoms." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 )

Respectfully consider also the following competent evidence-- Judge Molleur also stated
he reviewed a consultative examination by Dr. John Casper, M.D. of the Claimant on June 11,
2009 and based on his examinations Dr. Casper opined "that the Claimant should not lift or carry
more than 25 lbs, more significantly, he opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged
standing and walking due to her low back pain." (CL Ex. D, p.5).
In reference to other medical records Judge Molleur reviewed, he affirmed that "the
State agency medical consultant's physical assessments are given little weight because they are
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inconsistent with the medical record." ( CL Ex. D, p.5 ). This is a significant statement of fact
from an impartial expert that should have been given important consideration by the Commission
as "finder of fact."
The Court does review questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and
competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,
910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). When that evidence is not lawfully considered then the conclusions
of fact by the Commission should be reviewed. If the Commission does not make a correct and
proper application of the law in regards to the evidence on record, this Court can overturn the
erroneous conclusion. Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986).
The Commission cannot just 'take notice of whatever it likes' --the Court affirms that
"witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite, 96 Idaho at
72, 524 P .2d at 533.
The Claimant wishes to also draw attention to the following evidence offered by the
Defendants. They erroneous state concerning Dr. Schwartsman' s report dated June 26, 2008, "He
had 'no explanation' for the Claimant's continued pain complaints and 'only noted' she did have
pain which corresponded with mild/ moderate arthritic changes seen in the x-rays." (LC.Def.
Response Brief. p. 8).
It should be factually noted regarding the Defendant's erroneous statement that in this
same report, Dr. Schwartsman noted that an MRI of the lunbar spine was reviewed. The MRI
shows a broad-based disc bulge and fissuring of the lateral annual fibers. The pathology is on the
left side at L4-5, which correlated with the location of the patient's symptoms specifically the
weakness and radiation of her pain ... I do feel that the majority of her symptoms are coming
from her lumbar spine specifically the annular tear. He also states that he thinks the patient (Ms.
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Shubert) needs to be evaluated by a qualified spine surgeon with regard to L4-5 and L5-S 1. This
report was dated June 26, 2008 after the Claimant was pronounced MMI by Dr. Greenwald. ( Cl.
Ex. F. Dr. Schwartsman./ 06/26/2008, p. 1-2).
Again it is not the intent of the Claimant to "rehash the facts" but in keeping with the
Courts own standard of review that the Court exercises free review over legal conclusions, but
will not set aside any finding of fact which are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Idaho Const. Art. V, Section 9; Excell Construction, Inc., v. State Department of Labor, 141
Idaho 688, 116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). However, it is of lawful importance to this Court that
the findings of fact 'are supported' by substantial and competent evidence. The Claimant has just
provided substantial and competent evidence clearly showing erroneous facts offered by the
Defense. The contention again is that the Commission's conclusions to the facts are to be legally
supported by competent and substantial "credible evidence."
The Claimant respectfully mentions another competent medical expert's opinion
regarding her MMI status after November 21, 2007. Dr. Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. stated on July
31, 2008, "It is my medical opinion, on a more probable than not basis, Ms. Shubert's ongoing
left-sided low back, left hip, and left leg symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006. I do
not believe Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." (Cl.Ex. F, Dr. Roy
Frizzell. / 07 /31/ 2008 p. 1-4 ).
This additional expert opinion statement by Dr. Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. was made after Dr.
Greenwald said she felt the Claimant was MMI on November 21, 2007.
The Court affirms that if there are conclusions of fact which are clearly erroneous they
should be appealed to this Court. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P 3d 1238
(2002). The Court defines substantial and competent evidence as "relevant evidence which a
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reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State
Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161,164,911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996).
The Claimant contents that the Commission does not have "substantial and compelling
evidence" to support their conclusions. However, the Claimant believes a reasonable mind could
easily support the conclusion that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007 when considering all
of the substantial and competent evidence submitted to the Commission by the Claimant.
The Claimant asks the Court to reconsider both the preponderance of evidence she has
submitted and its competency. The Claimant in support of this lawful appeal has noted in her
Claimant's Response Brief where she referenced 11 different doctor reports by 7 different
doctors that have evaluated the Claimant's work-related injury and concluded she has as an L4-5
annular disc tear with abroad based disc bulge with fissuring and tearing of the far left annular
fibers ( LC. Cl. Resp. Brief, p. 11-14); 3 different medical experts (Dr. Lossman, Dr. Krafft, and
Dr. Frizzell) state that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty there is a causal relationship
between the her symptoms and the reported injury. ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 4-6); 4 medical
experts that opined that the majority of her ongoing symptoms are related to her L4-5 injury
(after the MMI date) ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief, p. 4-5/ CL Ex. D. p. 4-5): a medical expert-- Dr.
Roy Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D. stated that he does not believe the Claimant was MMI on July 31,
2008 (after the proposed MMI date) (LC.Cl. Opening Brief, p.6 ); Judge Molleur /an
administrative law judge determined that the Claimant's onset of disability was preceded by a
work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1, 2006; Judge Molleur stated she is
'disabled' (post-MMI date) (Cl. Ex. D. p.1 and 4); an impartial vocational expert who testified
under oath that the demands of the claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional
capacity (Cl. Ex. D, p. 5); and uncontradicted personal witnesses who attest to the Claimant's
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ongoing medical issues resulting from her work-related injury after the pronounced MMI date.
The Defendant's have only 'one doctor' (Dr. Greenwald) who felt the Claimant was MMI on
November 21, 2007. (Cl.Ex. E ).
The Claimant has just shown where the Defendant's presented erroneous statements in
regards to medical evaluations of the Claimant's condition from Dr. Schwartsman and Dr.
Frizzel. This Court has asserted that when "generalities are considered as fact, particularly when
a factual issue is closely contended, a case should be reconsidered to the fact finder for
reconsideration of relevant issues without errors." Kele v Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho
681,905 P2d 82 (Idaho App 1995).
The Claimant appeals to this Court's standard of review--"that whether the offered
conclusion can be met by the substantial and competent evidence." Id. Substantial and competent
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in support of the offered
conclusion. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). The
Claimant has provided substantial medical testimony that supports her appeal that she was not
MMI on November 21, 2007 to "a reasonable degree of medical probability." Langley v. State
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). The Court defines
"probable as having more evidence for than against." Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho
341. 344,528 P.2d 903,906 (1974).
The Claimant contents that she was not MMI on November 21, 2007-and that the
Commission has not met the Court's evidence standard to support their conclusion. Therefore the
Claimant respectfully appeals to this Court to overturn this erroneous conclusion that she was
MMI on and after November 21, 2007.
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II.

That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence
submitted when they denied the Claimant ongoing medical benefits that are
causally related to her work-related injury

To receive benefits under Idaho workers compensation regime, a claimant must establish
that he or she suffered an injury as defined by Idaho Code 72-102. Dinius v. Loving Care and
More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 574, 990 P.2d 738, 740 (1999). As noted per Idaho Code 72-432, "If
an employer fails to provide the same-the injured employee may do so at the expense of the
employer." The Claimant has already provided substantial evidence in this Appellate Brief
before the Court that the "injury for which benefits are claimed is casually related to the workrelated accident." Wichterman v. J.H. Kellley, Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 158, P .3d 301 (2007).
Idaho Code 72-432(1) protects employees mandating that employers provide necessary
medical services for employees injured on the job. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Edmondson,
130 Idaho 108, 111, 937 P.2d 420,423 (1997). The Court also affirms that Idaho Code section
72-432(1) is not a tool that can be used by an employer or surety to deny benefits-it merely
ensures that an employer or surety is limited to compensating for only medical treatment related
to an employee's industrial accident or disease. Fife v. Home Depot, Inc., Idaho at 260, P.3d at
1184.

If an employee wishes to be compensated for this treatment, the employee must show that
the care was reasonable and that it was related to the industrial accident or disease. Henderson,
142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103. The reasonableness of a required treatment is an analysis
required by LC. 72-432(1). Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet & Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 298, 859,
P.2d 330, 334 (1993). Per the Court even though medical care is reasonable, it is still not
compensable unless the care was" due to the industrial accident." Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565,
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130 P.3d 1097, 1103. The Claimant's ongoing pain and impairments therefore should be
compensable because they are causally connected to her industrial accident on May 1, 2006.
Per the lawful requirement of this Court-if the Commission's findings are not
supported by substantial and competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive. Dean v.
Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161, 540 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1975).The Claimant contends that the
conclusions of Referee Powers in Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation
and of that of the Commission in their Order Denying Reconsideration are not based upon the
Courts required evidence standard and that she is legally entitled to ongoing medical.
Also the Claimant would like to note that the Defendant's assert that they are not
responsible for payment for medical charges after the Claimant's MMI date; however, let it be
noted that "if the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the
expense of the employer." LC. 72-432.
The Defendants falsely assert that "authorization for care from surety was never
requested for subsequent physicians." ( Def. Response Brief, p.14 top).
Per a letter, dated January 15, 2008, from Marsha Gregory/Liberty Northwest to Stephen
Stark (attorney for Claimant at the time of the letter) she stated, "At this point, I will not
authorize a second opinion with an orthopedic physician." (Def.Ex. J, p. 121). Again note this
was after the proposed MMI date.
First consider the fact that "she did seek additional help from surety after the MMI date
of November 21, 2007." The Claimant did call Dr. Greenwald's office for additional help and
was denied. ( Tr., p. 41, L. 21-25 ). This denial for additional medical care for her ongoing workrelated injury was before the Claimant met with Dr. Schwartsman on June 28, 2008. Obviously
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these are erroneous assertions made by the Defendants because the Claimant did contact surety
and was denied additional medical help and was also denied a referral to another physician.
When erroneous evidence is considered particularly when a factual issue is closely
contended, a case should be remanded to the fact finder for reconsideration of relevant issues
without errors. Kele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 681,905 P 2d 82 (Idaho App 1995).
The Claimant asserts that these were erroneous facts offered by the Defendants and that the
Commission needs to reconsider their erroneous conclusion to the evidence submitted.
In the Order Denying Reconsideration , the Commission stated that "as to the Claimant's
request for additional medical care, the record supports that the Claimant did not benefit from
additional treatment, and that 'none' of her treating physicians referred her for additional
treatment post MMI date." ( R., p. 39, L. 1-4 ). The Claimant would like to respectfully content
with this erroneous statement.
The Commission stated that "the records of Dr. Frizzell submitted by the Claimant do not
provide a well-reasoned analysis that connects the Claimant's accident to a specific injury and
this specific injury to her pain, nor any medical rationale justifying his recommendation in light
of the Claimant's history. At best, Dr. Frizzell's statement causally connecting the Claimant's
complaints to the industrial accident is incomplete in its analysis; at worst it is simply an
unsupported conclusion." ( R., p. 19-20 ).

If one considers the conclusion to the facts stated in the Record (p. 19-20) by the
Commission in regards to Dr. Frizzell' s expert medical testimony-it is obvious they are abusing
their discretion in regards to the facts presented and are making erroneous conclusions.
Dr. Frizzell did make a "well reasoned analysis that connects the Claimant's accident"
(May 1, 2006-tripped and fell forward with her left leg flexed underneath her) to a "specific
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injury"(she subsequently has developed significant left-sided low back pain and left leg pain)
and this "specific injury to her pain." He also stated that in regards to her past medical history
there are ·'no significant lumbar injuries or left lumbar pain with leg radiation"; therefore,
justifying his recommendation in light of the Claimant's history." (Cl.Ex. Fl Dr. Frizzell,
07131/2008. p. 1-4).
The Claimant again respectfully contends that this is an erroneous conclusion to the facts
submitted. Dr. Frizzell stated that he had the opportunity to take a history, examine, review the
records and reviewed the imaging studies on Ms. LuAnn Shubert. He further states that in
regards to past medical history ... to my understanding no significant lumbar injuries or left
lumbar pain with leg radiation. Dr. Frizzell opined that it is my medical opinion, on a more
probable than not basis, that Ms. Shubert's ongoing left-sided low back, left hip, and left leg
symptoms are related to her fall on May 1, 2006." He further opined that "I do not believe that
Ms. Shubert is at maximum medical improvement at this time." (Cl. Ex. Fl Dr. Frizzzelll
07131/2008, p.1-4). Again this medical expert's statement was made after Dr. Greenwald felt the
Claimant was MMI.
The Court has stated that "no magic" words are necessary when a physician plainly and
unequivocally conveys his or her conviction that events are causally related." Paulson v. Idaho
Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896,901,591 P.2d 143, 148 (1979).
The Claimant has proven with both substantial and competent evidence that some of her
medical treatment after her post-MMI date was casually related to her industrial accident and that
she is entitled to ongoing medical care that is causally related to her work-related injury. Hughes
v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 48 P3d 1238 (2002).
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This Court has also held that the referee "must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted
testimony of a credible witness, unless this testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by
facts and circumstances at the hearing or trial." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,
447, 72 P 2d 171, 175 (1937).
Referee Powers at the hearing excluded written witness testimonies from Inga Shubert
and Terry Wood as "heresy" because there's no way for anybody to cross-examine him or her
unless they're here present at the hearing. ( Tr., p. 14, L .2-25/ p.15, L. 1-5).
The referee or the Commission cannot just 'take notice of whatever it likes' ----the Court
affirms that "witnesses are still necessary." Pomerinke, 124 Idaho at 306, 859 P .2d at 342: Hite,
96 Idaho at 72,524 P .2d at 533.
These testimonies in the Claimant's Exhibit E were augmented into the Agency Record
through an Objection to Records by the Claimant ( R., page 54 ). The Claimant would like to
again confirm that the role of the referee is one of finder of fact. Idaho Const. Art. V section 9.
These witness testimonies regarding the Claimant's ongoing medical condition as a
result of her work-related injury were submitted to give credible and uncontradicted evidence in
support of her legal right for ongoing medical care that is causally related to her work-related
injury.
Respectfully consider Judge Molleur/ Administrative Law Judge's impartial opinion
regarding these testimonies when he asserts "the testimonies of Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and
Terry Wood-although not medically trained, these statements provide insight into the severity
of the Claimant's impairments and how those impairments affect the Claimant's ability to
function--as such the undersigned accords great weight to these statements." ( CL Ex. D, p. 4-6 ).
Per Inga Shubert ... "She (Claimant) use to be cheerful and outgoing, but now she is
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consumed by pain. She is so controlled by her pain, but she is not one to whine and complain
publically, but instead suffers in silence. This injury has physically and emotionally taken her
life." ( CL Ex. E /Inga Shubert). Or consider Terry Wood's written testimony where she states
"I have known LuAnn all her life and this has changed her whole life. In the last three years
because of her back pain she hurts and is in pain 24 hrs per day. It is not the LuAnn she once was
... now all you see is pain." ( CL Ex. E / Terry \Vood ). Or respectfully consider yet another
testimony that of Rick Shubert who has been married to the Claimant for almost forty years this
year. He stated, "She is unable to work because of the present pain she is going thrn because of
this accident ... believe me-we would like to have our life back! This is affecting every area of
her life and our life together. She can only walk short distances, needs to lay down a lot,
continual pain, loss of income, etc. We are currently trying to survive-this is not how we want
to live." ( CL Ex. E/Rick Shubert). These written testimonies were given after Dr. Greenwald
stated the Claimant was MMI on November 21, 2007.

If for some lawful reason Referee Powers can exclude as "heresy" the written
testimonies submitted before this Court, then respectfully consider the sworn testimony of the
Claimant's husband-Rick Shubert at the hearing. ( Tr., p. 51, L.1-25/ p. 52, L. 1-25/ p. 53, L. 125 ). Per Mr. Shubert' s sworn testimony there is again additional substantial and competent
evidence presented to support the Claimant's contention that she was never at MMI status and
that she should be entitled to ongoing medical care. This is credible testimony from the
Claimant's husband--someone who actually testified under oath regarding the daily life style of
the Claimant. This attests to the facts of how her ongoing pain and impairments from this workrelated injury have impacted her life on a day-by-day basis. This witness testimony should be
regarded with significant weight because of the fact that the Claimant's husband can trnthfull y
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verify as to the impact the ongoing pain and impairments are having on the Claimants daily life
and her need for ongoing medical care for this work-related injury.
Again the Claimant refers to the "substantial and competent evidence" standard. Idaho
Const. Art. V, Section 9; Excell Construstion, Inc., v. State Department of Labor, 141 Idaho 688,
116 P3d 18, (Idaho App, 2005). Whetherthis standard is met is determined ' if facts are such that
a reasonable mind might accept them in support of the offered conclusion.' Uhl v. Ballard Metal
Products, 138 Idaho 653, 67 P 3d 1265 authority (Id). The Claimant respectfully believes that a
reasonable mind after reviewing the facts from the medical experts and personal witnesses would
find that she is entitled to ongoing medical benefits that are causally related to her work-related
injury after Dr. Greenwald's proposed MMI date of November 21, 2007.
The Claimant would also like the Court to respectfully consider the following erroneous
conclusion to the facts by the Commission. In the Order Denying Reconsideration, the
Commission states that "as to the Claimant's request for additional medical care, the record
supports that the Client did not benefit from additional treatment, and that 'none' of her treating
physicians referred her for additional treatment post MMI date." ( R., p.39, top par).
Let it be respectfully noted per the evidence submitted by the Claimant that she was
examined by Dr. Schwartsman on June 26, 2008 and he recommended Ms. Shubert see a spine
surgeon. Upon that recommendation, the Claimant met with Dr. Frizzell, a neurosurgeon who
had the opportunity to take a history, examine, review the records, and review the imaging
studies on Ms. LuAnn Shubert. Dr. Frizzell referred the Claimant to Dr. Sandra Thompson for a
possible spine stimulator trial. Ms. Shubert upon that recommendation met with Dr. Thompson
and had the spine stimulator trial surgery done. ( LC. Cl. Opening Brief/ p.5-6 ). This was a
direct referral from Dr. Frizzell. ( Tr., p.47, L. 1-25 ).
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In the Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration, they also assert that "as to the
Claimant's request for additional medical care, the record supported that the Claimant did not
benefit from additional treatment, and that none of her treating physicians referred her for
additional treatment post-MMI date. The Claimant 'did not present any evidence from any
expert' regarding disability in excess of impairment." ( R., p. 38-39 ).The Claimant has already
given substantial expert medical evidence regarding her disability in excess of impairment by
Judge Molleur. (Cl. Ex. D, p.l).
The Commission again erroneously asserts that although Dr. Frizzell proposed yet more
testing, "we find, on balance, that Dr. Greenwald correctly found that further treatment/testing
would not be efficacious." ( R., p. 40/ middle para. )
Dr. Greenwald stated in her clinic report on 03/12/2007 that she (Ms. Shubert) had a fall
landing on her left knee and continues to have left leg symptoms with annular tear on MRI ...
"the overall outlook will hopefully be that with an annular tear she will get full recovery with no
permanent impairment. It is just a very slow go at this point." ( Def. Ex. G. p. 76).
It is legally imperative to review Dr.Greenwald's clinic reports regarding the
Commission's conclusions to verify whether their conclusions are supported by the facts. On
11/01/2007 Dr. Greenwald further stated she (Claimant) has left leg symptoms on MRI and L5S 1 small central disc protrnsion... at L4-5 there is a mild broad disk bulge with no significant
impingement syndrome. Dr. Greenwald acknowledged the Claimant's annular tear issue in her
clinical report. (Def.Ex. G, p.77 ). There is 'no mention that further testing would not be
beneficial.'
Dr. Greenwald in her final clinical report on November 21, 2007 when she felt Ms.
Shubert was at MMI further stated that she does fulfill the criteria for an AMA Guide to
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Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ... because she has difficulty with her activities of daily
living. Work-she (Claimant) states it is very painful at the end of the day. (Def.Ex. G., p. 8586 ). Dr. Greenwald does not state that further treatment or testing would not be beneficial.
"Rehashing the evidence" is again not the issue-rather the Claimant is contending by
these cited examples that the Commission again made "erroneous conclusions" in regards to the
evidence submitted. It is clearly evident from the evidence submitted by the Claimant that her
treating physicians did refer her for additional treatment post MMI date and that she did have
ongoing medical complications from her work-related injury. Again recalling the Courts
decision in Blayney v. City of Boise, 110 Idaho 302, 715 P 2d 972 (1986)--if the Commission
does not make a correct and proper application of the law in regards to the evidence on record,
this Court can overturn the erroneous conclusion.
In regards to the statement by the Commission that the Claimant did not benefit from
additional treatment, the Claimant would like to cite Idaho Code 72-423: Permanent disability
results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent
"because of permanent impairment and 'no fundamental or marked change in the future' can be
reasonably expected." The Claimant was given an impairment rating because of her work-related
lllJUry.
However, to contend with the Commissions assertion that she did not 'benefit from
additional treatment' the Claimant respectfully asserts that on March 29, 20011 Judge Molleur
determined that she was "disabled' as a result of her work-related injury.
How can the Commission contend that she did not "benefit from additional treatment"
when she is permanently disabled? The definition of permanent disability in this Idaho Code
describes a condition of the injured person that 'no fundamental or marked change in the future
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can be reasonably expected.' The Claimant asserts that the Commission legally erred in their
conclusions in regards to this substantial evidence and that she should be entitled to ongoing
medical benefits that are causally related to her industrial injury because she is disabled.
The Court stated that should an employer or surety deny benefits, (Idaho Code 72-432)
(1) it can still mandate later compensation if treatment is necessary, reasonable, and related to the

industrial accident. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630,634, 115 P.3d 721, 725 (2005). In
Troutner, 97 Idaho at 528, 527 Pat .2d 133, the surety can be liable despite the initial refusal to
authorize treatment. The Claimant's personal-out-of-pocket medical expenses, insurance copays, transportation costs for medical treatment, prescriptions, and ongoing medical care etc.,
related to this work-related injury (post-MMI date) should all be reimbursed. The Claimant 'was
injured at work.' An employee's employer and surety are "liable for medical expenses incurred
as a result of an 'injury' (i.e. an employment related accident). Idaho Code 72-432 (1); Sweeney
v. Great West Transp. 110 Idaho 67, 71, 714, P.2d 36, 40, (1986).
Per the Court if the findings of the Commission are not supported by "substantial,
competent evidence, they are not binding or conclusive ... " Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158,
161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340 Z(1975). This Court further states "substantial and competent evidence
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Eacret v.
Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). It is contended that the
Claimant has met this evidence standard to support her appeal.
The Defendant's have "one doctor" (Dr. Greenwald) who stated the Claimant was MMI.
The Claimant has provided substantial and competent medical testimony that supports her claim
for ongoing medical benefits because of her work-related injury to a reasonable degree of
medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890
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P.2d 732 (1995). The Court defines "probable' as having more evidence for than against."
Fisher v. Bunker Hill Company, 96 Idaho 341, 344, 528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The Claimant
contends that she has submitted "substantially more evidence to support her appeal than there is
against it."
Let it be respectfully asserted that the Claimant has provided substantial and competent
evidence from numerous medical experts, an administrative law judge, a vocational expert, and
personal witnesses that attest that her ongoing medical condition is causally related to her workrelated injury. The Claimant contends that she is legally entitled to ongoing medical care (post
MMI date) that is causally related to her work-related injury.

III.

That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abuse of their discretion
when they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the
evidence submitted when they denied the Claimant total and partial temporary
disability benefits

The Claimant is contending that she has been in a period of recovery since her workrelated injury on May 1, 2006 up to November 25, 2008-- the date when Judge Molleur opined
that she was disabled as a result of her work-related injury. (Cl.Ex. D, p. 1). Pursuant to Idaho
Code 72-408, "Income benefits for total and partial disability during the period of recovery, and
thereafter in cases of total and permanent disability, shall be paid to the disabled employee."
The Claimant has provided substantial and competent proof by medical experts that attest
to the fact that she has not recovered from this work-related injury after the post-MMI date and
that she was in a period ofrecovery until she was found to be disabled from her work-related
injury. The Claimant asserts that the Commission has abused their discretion by drawing an
erroneous conclusion from the evidence provided. Hughes v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349,
48 P3d 1238 (2002).
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The expert opinions presented by the Claimant meet the credibility standard because they
have considered all the relevant facts. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 735, 40
P.3d 91, 93 (2002). This Court addresses the medical testimony issue where the Claimant must
"provide medical testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of
medical probability." Langley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890
P.2d 732 (1995). This Court defines "probable as having more evidence for than against." Fisher
v. Bunker Hill Company., 96 Idaho 341,344,528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). The Claimant
respectfully contends that she has met this required 'probability standard' as required by the
Court to have her appeal granted.
The Claimant is contending that she is legally entitled to additional partial and
total permanent disability benefits post-MMI date because she has never recovered from the
work-related injury on May 1, 2006. If the Claimant has not reached MMI by a certain date as
shown by substantial evidence then the Claimant is entitled to benefits.
Per this Court medical care is compensable if it is due to the industrial accident.
Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d 1097, 1103 (2006). Should an
employee deny benefits, LC. 72-432(1) the Court can still mandate later compensation if the
treatment was necessary, reasonable, and related to the industrial accident. Reese v. V-1 Oil Co.,
141 Idaho 630,634, 115 P.3d 721, 725 (2005) (LC. 72-432(1).
Referee Power's in his Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation stated
in response to the Claimant's request for income benefits that "none of the records submitted
were sufficient to challenge Dr. Greenwald's determination that the Claimant had reached a point
of medical stability." (R., p. 20-21). However, let it be noted to the Court that the Claimant
submitted Exhibit D giving medical expert evidence by an administrative law judge who did
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opine that she was disabled and not in an MMI status. ( Tr., p. 14, L. 9-12 ). Therefore. Referee
Power's conclusion to the facts is respectfully challenged as erroneous and should be overturned.
The Defendant's in their LC. Response Brief when replying to the Claimant's requested
entitlement for Time Loss Benefits state that none of them opined she was in a period of
recovery, took her off work, or offered additional restrictions. There is no medical evidence
supporting the Claimant's contention she is entitled to TTD's.'' (LC.Def. Resp. Brief., p. 1617).
In regards to these erroneous statements, let it be recalled to this Court the following
"facts" regarding the Claimant's ongoing medical condition post-MMI date:
The Claimant was pronounced disabled by an expert administrative law judge-Judge Molleur" stated that the medical record further supports the claimant's allegation
of disabling impairments; he found that the Claimant cannot perform work activity at a
medium level of physical exertion; a vocational expert testified under oath that the
Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional capacity; finally the
testimonies of Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Wood-although not medically
trained, these statements provide insight into the severity of the Claimant's impairments
and how those impairments affect the Claimant's ability to function ... as such the
undersigned accords great weight to these statements." (Cl.Ex .D, p. 4-6 ).
Let it also be respectfully noted that on June 11, 2009 (after the proposed MMI date) Dr.
Casper opined that the Claimant should not life or carry more than 25lbs (a lifting
restriction). More significantly, he opined that she would have difficulties in a prolonged
standing and walking due to her low back pain. (Cl. Ex. D., p.5).

This Court states if the findings of the Commission are not "supported by substantial
competent evidence, they are not binding and conclusive" and should be appealed for review.
Dean v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 158, 161,540 P.2d 1337, 1340.(1975). In such instances, the
findings of fact will be set aside on appeal. Id.
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Idaho Code 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during an
injured worker's period of recovery. The Claimant therefore contents that she is entitled to
income benefits for total and partial disability during her period of recovery.

IV.

That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence
submitted when they failed to conclude that the Claimant should be entitled to
total permanent disability benefits

Referee Powers asked the Claimant during the hearing, "Has anybody ever assigned you
what's called a permanent partial impairment rating?" The Claimant responded, "Nancy
Greenwald did. She did a five percent for a hip bruise." Referee Powers then cautions the
Claimant "that in order to get disability you have to have an impairment." ( Tr., p. 6, L. 15-24 ).
Referee Powers did conclude in Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations
that the Claimant has proven she suffers permanent disability of 10% inclusive of her permanent
impairment. (R ., p.23 par. 47 ).
Permanent disability results when ''the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful
activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked
changed in the future can be reasonably expected." (Idaho Code 72-423). Idaho Code 72-430
defines that the evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured employee's
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical
factor of impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factor.
When determining percentages of permanent disabilities, Idaho Code 72-430( 1) states
that account should be taken of the nature of disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to
handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple
injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of the accident causing
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the injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration given to the diminished
ability of the affected employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and
other factors.
The test for determining whether the Claimant has suffered permanent disability greater
than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken into conjunction with
nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill v.
Swift & Company, 115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). The determination of
permanent disability is focused on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity. Sund v.
Gambrel, 127, Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329,333 (1955). Idaho Code 72-425 requires the
Commission to assess not just the Claimant's present ability to engage in gainful activity, but
also her probable future ability.
The Court stated that "in workman's compensation cases the burden is on the Claimant to
present expert medical opinion evidence of extent and duration of the disability in order to
recover income benefits from such disability."' Sykes v. C.P. Clare and Company, 100 Idaho
761,763,605, P.2d 939,941 (1980).
The Commission asserted that the "Claimant has produced no competing medical opinion
from which any other assessment could be determined." (R., p. 21, par.43). In contention to this
erroneous statement the Claimant respectfully calls the Courts attention to the following expert
testimonies submitted as evidence in her hearing before the Commission.
The standard of the Court for witness testimony is that in regards to "testimony of a
witness that neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the
testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes of know law, if such testimony does
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not exceed probability." Jeffrev v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872, 874). The Court
states that the mle applicable to "all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an
action, is that either a board, a court, or a jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted
testimonies of a credible witness." Manley v. Harvey Lumber Co., 174 Minn. 489, 221, N.W.
913,914. Finally it has been noted by this Court that the "standard of credibility for an expert" is
did they take into consideration all relevant facts.
Ann F.Aastum, was an impartial, vocation expert who testified under oath at the
Claimant's hearing before Administrative Law Judge Molleur on February 10, 2011. Judge
Molleur states regarding Ms.Aastum's profession opinion:
"The vocation expert described the Claimant's past relevant work as a sales clerkwomen's apparel, which is a semi-skilled job performed that the light level of physical
exertion. As the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for only sedentary
work, the demands of the Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional
capacity." ( Cl. Ex. D. p. 3, 5, and 6 ).
Dr. John Casper, M.D. following his examination of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) on June 11,
2009, opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged standing or walking due to her low
back pain." (Cl. Ex. D, p.5). These expert testimonies regarding the Claimant's were both post-

MMI date.
These assessments from competent expert opinions (both medically and vocationally)
were offered as substantial evidence by the Claimant.
Judge John T. Molleur/Administrative Law Judge for the Social Security
Administration/Office of Disability Adjudication and Review in his decision date March 29,
2011 stated regarding the Claimant's disability-'fully favorable.' Per his statement, "I carefully
reviewed the facts of your case and made the enclosed fully favorable decision." ( Ex. D, p.1 ).
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Judge Molleur also stated his lawful guidelines in determination of the Claimant's
condition:
"An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the meaning of
the regulations if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work
activities ... An individual's residual functional capacity is her ability to do physical and
mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from her impairments .. .If
the Claimant has the residual functional capacity to do her past relevant work, the
claimant is not disabled...the undersigned must determine whether the Claimant is able
to do any other work considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work experience. If the Claimant is able to do other work, she is not disabled." (Cl.Ex.
D, p.2 ).
He states regarding the Claimant (Ms. Shubert), "The medical record further
supports the Claimant's allegation of disabling impairments. The Claimant's onset of
disability was preceded by a work-related injury when she tripped and fell on May 1,
2006. Since that time, she has complained of radiating pain down the back of her leg. Dr.
Schwartsman noted that she had annular tears at L4-5, which correlated with the location
of the Claimant's symptoms ... She has undergone numerous conservative and invasive
treatment modalities ... unfortunately these treatments have not provided relief. Further,
in March 2009, she sought a consultation with Dr. Frizzell who opined that she was not a
surgical candidate." ( Cl. Ex. D, p.4 ).

Judge Molleur stated further that as required by regulations he had "reviewed and
evaluated the various opinions included in the medical record." He stated regarding the
functional capacity evaluation the Claimant underwent on April 6, 2009 that lasted
approximately 4 hours:
"Based on the results, the physical therapist opined that the Claimant could
perform at the medium level of physical exertion. The undersigned rejects these findings
for a number of reasons. At the hearing, the Claimant testified that she could lie down
approximately 5 minutes between activities. Such frequent breaks are inconsistent with
work performed at the medium exertion level. Similarly, regardless of her lifting
capabilities, the Claimant's noted inability to stand for a sustained period greater than 3-4
minutes places her in the sedentary category. Finally, while noting a good effort, the
therapist noted the Claimant displayed increasing dysfunction as testing continued.
Taking all these factors into considerations, the undersigned finds the conclusion that the
Claimant can perform work activity at a medium level of physical exertion is not
supported. As such, the undersigned accords the residual functional capacity no
evidentiary weight." (Cl.Ex. D. p. 4-5 )Judge Molleur acknowledges that in regards to
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the personal testimony statements provided by Inga Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry
Wood that he stated, "Although not medically trained, these statements provide insight
into the severity of the Claimant's impairments and how those impairments affect the
Claimant's ability to function. As such, the undersigned accords great weight to these
statements." ( Cl. Ex D. p. 5 ).
Judge Molleur further states that "based on a residual functional capacity for the full
range of sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and work experience, he
found the Claimant 'disabled.' (Cl.Ex. D. p. 6 ).

It is important to again note the expert medical opinion of Judge Molleur regarding his
review of the Claimant's medical records. He asserts that "the State agency medical consultant's
physical assessments are given little weight because they are inconsistent with the medical
records." (Cl.Ex. D, p.5 ). This statement is cited to show this Court that the Claimant did offer
"competing medical opinion" contrary to the Commission's statement. Further, the Claimant
respectfully contends that the Commission erred in its lawful role as "finder of facts" and that
their conclusions do not meet the "evidence standard" set by this Court.
The Claimant asserts that she has offered substantial and competent evidence regarding
both of these lawful requirements in regards to her future ability to engage in gainful activity as
affected by her ongoing impairments. The Claimant again refers to this Court's "medical
probability standard." It is understood that the Claimant must provide medical testimony that
supports a claim for compensation to "a reasonable degree of medical probability." Langley v.
State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). The Court will
disturb the Commission's finding of fact on appeal if they are not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 39, 175 P.3d 199,
201 (2007). Also, the Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of
evidence will be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous." Moore v. Moore, No. 37083, 2011 WL
310376 (Feb. 2, 2001). The Claimant respectfully contends that she has exceeded by
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overwhelming evidence the lawful requirements in these aforementioned laws and that the
Commission's conclusions are erroneous and should be overturned in this appeal.
The Claimant respectfully believes she has submitted a preponderance of medical and
personal testimony as evidence that supports her appeal that she should be entitled to total
permanent disability benefits from the date she was declared 'disabled' by Judge Molleur on
November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D, p.1). The Claimant respectfully appeals this court for this ruling
because of the total loss of her earning capacity in the labor market due to her work-related
injury. Idaho Code 72-430.

V.

That the Commission erred as a matter of law or abused their discretion when
they did not make a correct and proper application of the law to the evidence
submitted when they concluded that the Claimant was able to enter the labor
market after her hearing

The Court states "that access to a labor market is central in demonstrating that a claimant
is totally and permanently disabled-that among the relevant non-medical factors the
Commission must consider in determining a disability rating is the diminished ability of the
afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee ... " Id. (LC. 72430(1).
Idaho Code 72-425 states "Evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the
injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is
affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as
provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code."
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The Court asserts that it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the
time of the hearing, not at some earlier time, that are relevant to the disability determination. The
Court states the word "present" implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability
to work as of the time evidence is received. There is no "present" opportunity for the
Commission to make its determination apart from the time of the hearing." Davaz v. Priest River
Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296.
In Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, Referee Powers
concluded that "the Claimant is denied a sizeable portion of the pre-injury labor market due to
the permanent limitations caused by her industrial accident coupled with her non-medical
limitation as discussed ... In light of the fact the Claimant 'can still perform many jobs' for
which she is best suited, but mindful of that portion of the potential job market from which she is
excluded by her accident. .. ( R., p. 23, par. 47).
The Claimant respectfully again recounts the aforementioned submitted evidence to
support her contention that the Referee Powers failed to consider her substantial and credible
evidence offered when he determined that she able to work at the time of the hearing November
13, 2012. The contention is that at the time of the hearing the Claimant's status was "disabled" as
a result of her work-related injury.
Judge Molleur further states on March 29, 2011 that "based on a residual functional
capacity for the full range of sedentary work, considering the Claimant's age, education, and
work experience, he found the Claimant disabled.' (Cl.Ex. D. p. 6 ). Respectfully note that this
expert judgment by Judge Molleur regarding the Claimant's disability was made prior to Referee
Power's Industrial Commission's hearing and that the Claimant had been disabled since
November 25, 2008. (Cl.Ex. D, p.1).
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Judge Molleur also acknowledges the personal testimony statements provided by Inga
Shubert, Rick Shubert, and Terry Wood. He stated, "Although not medically trained, these
statements provide insight into the severity of the Claimant's impairments and how those
impairments affect the Claimant's ability to function. As such, the undersigned accords great
weight to these statements." (Cl.Ex D. p. 5 ).
Judge Molleur states regarding Ms.Aastum' s profession opinion:
"The vocation expert described the Claimant's past relevant work as a sales clerkwomen's apparel, which is a semi-skilled job performed at the light level of physical
exertion. As the Claimant retains the residual functional capacity for only sedentary
work, the demands of the Claimant's past relevant work exceed her residual functional
capacity." ( Cl. Ex. D. p. 3, 5, and 6 ).

Dr. John Casper, M.D. following his examination of Ms. Shubert (Claimant) on June 11,
2009, opined that she would have difficulty in prolonged standing or walking due to her low
back pain." (CL Ex. D, p.5). These expert testimonies regarding the Claimant's disability were
all given after the MMI date.
At the time of the hearing the Claimant was "disabled" and the evidence she submitted
contained both substantial and credible expert opinion and uncontradicted personal witness
testimony regarding her disability. It is contended by the Claimant that the Commission erred in
regards to the Court's rnling that "it is the claimant's personal and economic circumstances at the
time of the hearing" that are relevant to the disability determination. The Court states the word
"present" implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability to work as of the time
evidence is received. There is no "present" opportunity for the Commission to make its
determination apart from the time of the hearing." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125
Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296.
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The Claimant is again aware that this Court will not set aside any finding of fact
that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but that this Court does review
questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the
Commission's findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P 2d 759, 760 (1996). The
Court's definition of substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Boise Orthopedic Clinic v. Idaho State
Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161, 164, 911 P .2d 754, 757 (1996).
The Claimant respectfully believes that a reasonable mind would find that the evidence
she has submitted would support her appeal in this matter.
Per Idaho Code 72-423 "permanent disability results when actual or presumed ability to
engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no
fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected."
The Claimant respectfully contends that she submitted "substantial and competent"
evidence at the time of her hearing before Referee Powers that supports her appeal that she is not
able to work and has lost her wage earning capacity. Therefore, she has lost her access to the
open labor market due to her disability resulting from her work-related injury on May 1, 2006
and that at the time of the hearing in contention to the Commissions conclusion-- she was
'disabled' and unable to gainfully work.
CONCLUSION
Obviously the Claimant wishes that this work-related injury on May 1, 2006 would never
have happened-however the fact is 'it did.' This industrial accident has dramatically changed
the Claimant's whole life--intense on-going pain; limiting effects of her weakness and inability
to function in a 'normal lifestyle;' other medical complications; a lifestyle significantly hindered
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and impaired by pain; financial loss because she can no longer work; let alone the loss because
she can no longer carry on the daily activities that she enjoyed (work, shopping, crafts, family
activities) the way she did before this work-related injury. Because of this life-changing workrelated injury---the Claimant believes that she legally entitled to: 1) ongoing medical benefits
that are causally related to her work-related injury; 2) total and partial temporary disability
benefits from the time of her work related injury up to the date of her disability, 3) total
permanent disability benefits from her date of disability onward, 4) reimbursement of all of her
personal out-of-pocket expenses related to her work-related injury after her proposed MMI date;
5) reimbursement of estimated lost 401K and pension plan benefits after her date of disability.
The Claimant respectfully appeals to this Court to rule in favor of her appeal because the
Idaho Industrial Commission's findings are not based on substantial and competent evidence. It
is respectfully contended that she is legally entitled to the above mentioned benefits and
reimbursements due to her work-related injury on May 1, 2006 that resulted in her disability.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ _ _day of June, 2014

LuAnn Shubert
Appellant/ Pro Se
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